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The State as an Unwilling
Defendant: Reflections
on Nevada v. Hall
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides an absolute de-
fense to any claim brought against a sovereign without its consent.
It is an old doctrine' which, although modified 2 and attacked,3 con-
* Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A., 1968,
Kalamazoo College; J.D., 1971, Northwestern University.
1. Originally, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was an outgrowth of the
medieval fiction that the king could do no wrong and was thus immune from
any such allegations as a matter of law. See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *239; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1
(1924). Although unpopular in the United States, the theory was adopted
early by the courts, see, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), The
Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1869), Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
122 (1869), Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824),
and persisted as a function of practicality:
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity
of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the
answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes.
(Leviathan, c.26, 2.) A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and prac-
tical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
2. The sovereign immunity of both the United States and the states does not
extend to certain suits against governmental officers for relief which does not
require the expenditure of funds of the government. Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 686 (1949) (allegation that federal official acted
either in excess of statutory authority or that authority itself was unconstitu-
tional removes any bar immunity might otherwise provide); Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 159-60 (1908) (allegation that state official acted or will act
unconstitutionally removes any bar immunity might otherwise provide).
Prospective, rather than retrospective relief, and expenses which are ancil-
lary, rather than primary, are the only types of relief available when immu-
nity is denied under this rationale. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979);
Edeman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The primary distinction between the
exceptions relates to the officer acting constitutionally but without statutory
authority. A federal officer may not claim immunity; whether a state officer is
protected depends solely on state law. See Field, The Eleventh Amendment
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tinues to reflect a legal truism. Legislation carving out exceptions
to the doctrine presupposes that the immunity exists.4 Nowhere,
however, does the Constitution of the United States specifically
confer such immunity on either the federal or state governments.5
Whatever the source of the protection, sovereign immunity is suffi-
cient to shield the United States from suits to which it does not
consent.6 However, if the defendant is a state, the source of the
immunity will determine its scope. If the Constitution implicitly
cloaks the states in all situations with such immunity, their protec-
tion is as complete as that of the federal government. If the doc-
trine has no source other than the common law, then the
protection it affords to the states depends upon the extent to which
the common law was changed by ratification of the Constitution.
In turn, the extent of the change depends upon where the state is
being sued and thus differs when the state is called upon to defend
in federal court, in its own courts, or in the courts of another state.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Nevada v. Hall7
and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L REV. 515,520
n.24 (1978).
3. See generally 3 K DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 551-72 (1976); Wall &
Childres, The Law of Restitution and the Federal Government, 66 Nw. L REV.
587 (1971); Note, 61 GEO. L.J. 1535 (1973). The feeling of discomfort with the
doctrine is not of recent vintage. It was seen as an anomaly as early as 1793 in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 1 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471-72 (1793), criticized in United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), and has recently been completely abolished
in one state as an obvious contradiction to the American theory of govern-
ment. Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709
(1978). Whether the amenability of the state to suit in its own courts also
constituted waiver of immunity to suit in the federal courts was at first un-
clear. Compare Greenfield v. Vesella, 457 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. Pa. 1978) with
Hernandez v. Whitesell, 462 F. Supp. 569 (ED. Pa. 1978). The issue was re-
solved by legislation denying such waiver. 1978 PA. LEGIS. SERV. 629-36.
4. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-319 (Reissue 1975); ILT. CONST. art. 13, § 4; note 6
infra.
5. Prior to union, the immunity of each state was that of a nation. Nathan v.
Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 (Ct. of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, 1781).
See also TuE FEDERALIST No. 81, 548 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
6. The United States has waived much of its immunity pursuant to three stat-
utes: Act of Oct. 21, 1976, PuB. L. No. 96-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (amending 5
U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (1976)); Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1970); and Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
7. 440 U.S. 410 (1979). Although the Supreme Court had never decided the is-
sue, the assumption prior to Hall was that such a suit could not be main-
tained. Indeed, the assumption was clearly shared by the Court. In
determining that an attempt by a state to escheat certain funds was invalid
when, because of the nature of the funds, it could not prevent other such
actions by other states and hence double liability of the defendant, the Court
stated that the other states could not have been made parties to the action.
Only in the Supreme Court could all interested states be forced to appear and
be subject to a binding determination. Western Union Co. v. Pennsylvania,
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determined the source and extent of the immunity of a state sued
in the courts of a sister state. California residents, injured in a car
accident in California, brought suit in California against the ad-
ministrator of the estate of the allegedly negligent driver (an em-
ployee of the University of Nevada), the University, and the State
of Nevada. The latter two defendants sought to quash service of
the summons and complaint, arguing that the California courts
lacked jurisdiction in the absence of Nevada's waiver of immunity.
Although Nevada had statutorily consented to suits based on such
tort claims, the waiver only applied to suits brought in the Nevada
state courts and the statute placed a $25,000 limit on any recovery
against the state.8 The California Supreme Court upheld the serv-
ice without determining whether Nevada's statutory waiver en-
368 U.S. 71 (1961). See also Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S.
446, 451 (1883):
It may be accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that
neither a State nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any
court in this country without their consent, except in the limited
class of cases in which a State may be made a party in the Supreme
Court of the United States by virtue of the original jurisdiction con-
ferred on this court by the Constitution.
In only one instance had a state supreme court confronted such a request
for jurisdiction prior to Hall. North Dakota was asked to permit a plaintiff to
sue the state of South Dakota, his employer, for damages sustained in North
Dakota-and refused. The plaintiff claimed to be a resident of South Dakota
in his initial attempt to hold South Dakota liable. Paulus v. South Dakota, 52
N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867 (1924). The California Supreme Court distinguished this
case from Hall because California's interest in protecting its residents dif-
fered from whatever interest North Dakota might have had in protecting per-
sons who worked in the state but were not residents. The plaintiff in Paulus
alleged that he was a resident of North Dakota in his second attempt to re-
cover, and his suit was again dismissed. The court reasoned:
Should the judicial branch of the government of one state under-
take to define the legal obligations of a nonconsenting sister state, it
would, in effect, be denying sovereignty of the latter. A state cannot
remain the supreme master of its own affairs if it must yield to exter-
nal conceptions in matters of justice and right. ..
Thus, so carefully have the sovereign prerogatives of a state been
safeguarded in the Federal Constitution that no state could be
brought into the courts of the United States at the suit of a citizen of
another state. Much less would it be consistent with any sound con-
ception of sovereignty that a state might be haled into the courts of a
sister sovereign state at the will or behest of citizens or residents of
the latter. He who would thus seek recourse should therefore be re-
quired to clearly show by his pleadings the unqualified consent of the
defendant.
Paulus v. South Dakota, 58 N.D. 643, 649, 227 N.W. 52, 54-55 (1929). Until Hall,
no one disputed either this rationale or result.
8. NE V. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (1965).
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compassed the California suit,9 holding that when Nevada, through
its agents, acted in another state, it did not and could not act in a
sovereign capacity since "state sovereignty ends at the state
boundary."'o Therefore, the defendants could not claim immunity
as a matter of right, and jurisdiction would fail only if California
agreed as a matter of comity to extend immunity. The Court rea-
soned that the potential embarassment to Nevada resulting from
being sued without its consent was outweighed by California's
substantial interest in providing a convenient forum for its injured
residents. This interest was bolstered by California's waiver of its
9. Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d 522,503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
10. Id. at 525, 503 P.2d at 1365, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 357. In support of this proposition,
the court relied on cases which permitted suit against a sister state when the
dispute involved real property owned by the sister state which was located in
the forum state. Even though such suits traditionally proceeded in rem, the
court reasoned that the sovereign status of the defendant was not affected by
the basis for jurisdiction. Id. See, e.g., Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472
(1924) (the holding seems to rest as much upon notions of consent implied by
the purchase of property subject to the authority of the state as it does upon
theoretical distinctions as to sovereign status, id. at 479-80). See note 12 in-
fra.
If one state is to obtain in personam jurisdiction over another state on a
transitory cause of action, the forum state must possess the authority to force
the other state to reenter the forum to defend the merits of its claim or to
suffer a default judgment. Irrespective of its status at the time the cause of
action arose, when the other state is served with process, it is served within
its own borders and hence as a sovereign. In contrast, when land belonging
to a state is attached in an in rem proceeding, the status of that state as the
owner of property remains constant. Since the forum state is never called
upon to act vis-a-vis the defendant state anywhere but within the forum (as
jurisdiction is obtained by attachment of the property), it is theoretically not
necessary to accord the other state recognition as a sovereign.
To assert jurisdiction over a state which is acting outside its borders, on
the theory that such activity cannot constitute sovereign activity, may, how-
ever, lead to a result similar to that currently espoused by international law.
See Martiniak, Hall v. Nevada: State Court Jurisdiction Over Sister States v.
American State Sovereign Immunity, 63 CALF. L REV. 1144 (1975). Interna-
tional immunity may protect sovereigns from suit in foreign courts only when
the activity giving rise to the plaintiff's claim was undertaken in the sover-
eign, rather than the commercial, capacity of the defendant. If a sovereign
state, which is acting outside its boundaries by definition can act only in a
commercial capacity, see, e.g., Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d at 525, 503
P.2d at 1365, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 357, then the restriction imposed by both theo-
ries is identical. Unfortunately, this restriction does not necessarily follow
from the Supreme Court's opinion in Hall. See notes 19-23 & accompanying
text infra. See also Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Soveriegn Im-
munity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 1203, 1232-86 (1978) (discussion of the difficulties raised by at-
tempting to distinguish governmental from commercial activities in a differ-
ent context).
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own immunity from like suits." Since the California jurisdictional
statute 12 had been otherwise properly invoked, the motion to
quash was dismissed. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari,13 but later agreed to review' 4 a subsequent California
appellate court determination which permitted an award of dam-
ages in excess of the Nevada limitation as well as upholding gener-
11. 8 Cal. 3d at 525-26, 503 P.2d at 1365-66, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58; compare id. with
Paulus v. South Dakota, supra note 8.
12. The California statute which was interpreted as permitting service on Nevada
treated the operation of a motor vehicle in California as implied consent by
the owner or driver of the vehicle to suit in California on a cause of action
arising out of the operation of the vehicle. The activity within the state con-
stituted the appointment of a state official as an agent of the defendant for
service of process. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17451 (West 1971). A similar statute was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), and
there is no doubt today that such jurisdiction over a nonresident driver com-
ports with due process. If the requirements of due process are met because
the defendant is considered to have consented to the suit, then the activity of
Nevada would be equivalent to consent and any defense of sovereign immu-
nity would already have been waived. However, Hess was decided prior to
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and was rendered
when Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) constituted the cornerstone of juris-
dictional law. Due process under Pennoyer required that a state have power
over a nonresident defendant in some physical sense before it exercised per-
sonal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Thus, the only acceptable
bases of jurisdiction were the presence of the defendant at the time process
was served, attachment of his property (which provided quasi in rem juris-
diction), the defendant's consent, his domicile, or status under the law of the
forum.
In attempting to fit the Hess facts into one of the preceding categories, the
Court there accepted the "consent" of the defendant as sufficient, although
under these circumstances it can by no means be actual and is undoubtedly
unknowing as well. Compare Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) with Kane
v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916). Under International Shoe, due process
was redefined to require certain contacts between the defendant and the
state. It might have been possible to read the International Shoe standard as
an expansion of Pennoyer, rather than a replacement of it. But Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), rejects this possibility. In broad language, Shaf-
fer requires minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state
prior to the exercise of any jurisdiction. The majority opinion, in determining
that the contacts between defendant directors of a Delaware corporation and
Delaware were insufficient to support jurisdiction, did refer to the lack of any
Delaware statute equating acceptance of a directorship of a state corporation
with consent to the state's jurisdiction. However, the logic of the primary
holding precludes recourse to such "forced consent," as well as to any other
traditional Pennoyer bases of jurisdiction, such as the presence of property.
Since the California statute in Hall was not drafted to compel waiver of im-
munity, and since, after Shaffer, it is no longer constitutionally sufficient to
compel jurisdiction, the statute ought not alone sustain the Hall result. See
Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction: A New Era, 57 NEB. L. REv. 523 (1978).
13. 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
14. 436 U.S. 925 (1978).
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ally the exercise of jurisdiction.'5
If it were to reverse the California judgment, the Supreme
Court would have had to find that the Constitution prohibited the
exercise of unlimited jurisdiction over Nevada, absent its con-
sent.16 Unless Nevada's status as a state created constitutional
constraints on California's assumption of such jurisdiction, ordi-
nary jurisdictional rules would not preclude the suit. Nevada, act-
ing through its agent, allegedly committed a tort in California, and
the plaintiffs' claim was directly related to that activity in the fo-
rum. Therefore, minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice existed between the de-
fendant and the forum; due process was not offended by forcing
the defendant either to enter the state and defend or to suffer the
entry of a default judgment against it. 17 The Supreme Court did
not follow the logic of the California holding, which resolved the
issue by stripping Nevada of any distinguishing characteristics
when it acts outside its own boundaries. Rather, the Court
searched in vain for a general constitutional command that one
state recognize another's sovereign immunity. Three possible
sources for such a command were suggested. First, Nevada argued
that the immunity is implicit in the Constitution. While three Jus-
tices agreed with this interpretation, 18 the majority held that no
constitutional provision either granted such immunity or sup-
ported its inference.' 9 Possible implications drawn from provi-
15. Hall v. University of Nev., 74 Cal-App.3d 280, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977).
16. U.S. CONST. art. HI, which defines and to some extent vests the judicial power
of the United States, also provides the limitations on that power. Only those
cases and controversies delineated by article III may be heard by a federal
court. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Hayburn's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). State law questions arising in the context of a claim
otherwise properly before the Court (e.g., diversity actions, pendent or ancil-
lary claims) may, of course, be reviewed there in the exercise of the Court's
appellate jurisdiction. However, even in that context the Court may only de-
termine what the state law is, not what it should be. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). A recent and clear pronouncement by the highest court of
the state is, therefore, binding. Thus, California's holding that comity would
not compel it to recognize Nevada's sovereign immunity must stand unless
the result so reached violates federal law. Absent such a violation, the state's
determination not to extend comity is the equivalent of a determination by a
sovereign nation and is completely within its discretion. See Schooner Ex-
change v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
17. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-20 (1945).
18. 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joined by Burger, CJ. & Rehn-
quist, J.).
19. 440 U.S. at 418-21. The majority opinion recognized that the failure to provide
immunity from a suit against one state in another's court may well have been
an oversight, resulting from the assumption of the framers of the Constitu-
tion that such protection would be adequately provided by "prevailing no-
tions of comity" and from their overriding concern with the immunity of the
1980]
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sions defining the federal judicial power were insufficient to create
a presumption of immunity from suit in a state system.20 Second,
Nevada argued that the full faith and credit clause 2' specifically
required other states to recognize its statutory definition of its own
immunity. However, the Court held that the full faith and credit
clause did not compel California to subordinate its strong and le-
gitimate public policy of providing a forum for its residents to the
conflicting policy of another state.22 Finally, Nevada urged that
states from suit in the federal system. Id. at 418-19. However, there was no
reason to read such an assumption into the Constitution. The dissenting Jus-
tices in Hall argued:
If the Framers were indeed concerned lest the States be haled before
the federal courts,. . . how much more must they have reprehended
the notion of a State's being haled before the courts of a sister State.
The concept of sovereign immunity prevailed at the time of the Con-
stitutional Convention. It is, for me, sufficiently fundamental to our
federal structure to have implicit constitutional dimension.
Id. at 431 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.).
Furthermore, to imply a constitutional right of immunity as an "essential
component of federalism" is only to utilize the same logic which supports a
constitutional right to travel. Id. at 430.
20. Id. at 419-21.
21. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Congress
has provided for the method of authenticating legislative acts and records
and judicial proceedings of a state court and has prescribed their effect:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Posses-
sion from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). The congressional command that state court judg-
ments be afforded full faith and credit in federal courts as well as state courts
has led one commentator to argue that in the context of claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), res judicata to some degree provides a federally man-
dated defense. See Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L.
REv. 317, 326-27 (1978). See also Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611
(1926) (barring in a different context a federal claim because of a prior state
judgment).
22. 440 U.S. at 421-24.
In the context of the discussion of full faith and credit, the majority did
indicate that perhaps not all fact situations would be encompassed by its de-
cision:
California's exercise of jurisdiction in this case poses no substantial
threat to our constitutional system of cooperative federalism. Suits
involving traffic accidents occurring outside Nevada could hardly in-
terfere with Nevada's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibil-
ities. We have no occasion, in this case, to consider whether different
state policies, either of California or of Nevada, might require a dif-
ferent analysis or a different result.
Id. at 424 n.24 This caveat leaves a good deal to be desired. It intimates that
[Vol. 59:246
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there are implicit constitutional constraints on a state's exercise of
comity, which prevent one state from treating another as an un-
friendly sovereign. Again, the Court disagreed, finding that the
granting of comity is nowhere controlled and remains entirely
within the forum's discretion.23
Standing alone, the majority opinion in Nevada v. Hall is both
clear and logical. It does, however, contrast oddly with the Court's
approach to the issue of state sovereign immunity in other con-
texts. It may well create a dual doctrine of immunity-one that
determines its source in reliance upon the system, federal or state,
in which a claim is brought. Furthermore, to the extent that the
opinion rests upon an analysis of the full faith and credit clause, it
raises more issues than it resolves.
II. SOVEREIGN IMlMUNITY
The Supreme Court has previously considered the issue of
state sovereign immunity in the context of suits brought against a
a limitation on California's jurisdiction might exist because of the character
of the defendant, but it fails to indicate either the source or scope of that
limitation. Given the Court's refusal to elevate state-state immunity to a con-
stitutional level, the full faith and credit clause must support any restriction;
yet its analysis of that clause rested solely upon a description of California's
interest in providing a remedy without monetary limitation for its injured
residents. Why that interest would change depending upon the cause of ac-
tion is unclear.
The Court's footnote may indicate that if Nevada's activity had either been
characterized as governmental or occurred within its own borders, California
would not have been free to disregard the defendant's traditional immunity.
See note 10 supra. To justify such a restriction, however, it would be neces-
sary either to consider Nevada's interest in the dispute (which the Court
failed to do in Hall) or to determine that there is a limitation on the discre-
tionary exercise of comity which is implicit in the Constitution.
If there is such a restriction on the exercise of comity, its source would
almost surely be the full faith and credit clause, which was an attempt to
formalize notions of comity in the situations to which the clause applied. See
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). Even if those notions of comity were
not to be frozen by the clause, see note 23 & accompanying text infra, at the
least the clause may provide some restraint on the development of notions of
comity by the individual states. Yet Justices White, Harlan, McKenna and
Day, dissenting in Fauntleroy, made this argument in a different context and
lost. Maintaining that comity had never been thought to place any moral obli-
gation on a sovereign to enforce a judgment based on what the forum consid-
ered to be an illegal contract, the four dissenting justices denied that the
now-constitutional obligation could be invoked to require such enforcement.
The majority disagreed. In any event, nowhere in the Hall opinion does the
Court indicate that the formulation of California's policy is subject to consti-
tutional restraint. Indeed, the majority recognizes that the Court will pre-
sume "policies of broad comity," but states bluntly that such a presumption
is rebuttable by the states without limitation. 440 U.S. at 425-26.
23. Id. at 425-27.
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state in federal rather than state courts. The earlier treatment of
the issue differs in two respects from Hall. First, with one early
and discredited exception,24 those opinions do not focus upon ex-
press constitutional language to determine that immunity exists,
nor do they automatically conclude that the lack of such language
precludes a claim of immunity.25 Second, the Court has never
clearly defined the source of a state's immunity in the federal sys-
tem; the opinions support arguments that it is constitutionally
compelled and that its existence is based solely upon the common
law. 2 6
States may be sued without their consent in two well-recog-
nized instances.27 A state may sue another state in the Supreme
24. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See notes 26-29 & accompany-
ing text infra.
25. See generally notes 27-40 & accompanying text infra. In one instance, the
Court also has not felt bound by specific language forbidding suits against a
state to be heard in the federal system. The Constitution states that "[t] he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment thus modifies article III, sec-
tion 2, which expressly included such controversies within the judicial power.
However, should a state consent to the described suit, subject matter juris-
diction is properly invoked, although the eleventh amendment contains no
exception to its prohibition. See Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't,
411 U.S. 279 (1973). While immunity has always been seen as a defense which
the sovereign may assert in its discretion, ordinarily consent to the exercise
of subject matter jurisdiction is irrelevant to its existence. See, e.g., Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
Of course, the determination of what constitutes consent of a state to be
sued must be made before jurisdiction is found. Actual waivers of immunity
occur most frequently by statute and are construed narrowly. Only the ex-
pressly stated immunity is waived, and it is waived only in accordance with
the terms of the legislation. See, e.g., Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900);
Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857); Skrbina v. Pennsylvania
Dep't of Highways, 468 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. Pa. 1979). Activity by the state may
also constitute consent to the suit and hence waiver of immunity, but it is
more difficult to define what is sufficient here. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.
436, 448 (1883) (claim by state for funds held by court pursuant to interlocu-
tory decree made the state a party "to the full extent required for its [the
litigation's] complete determination"). Compare Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
U.S. 184 (1964) (conducting railroad subject to congressional legislation con-
stitutes consent to suit under that legislation) with Employees v. Missouri
Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (operation of hospital does not consti-
tute consent to suit under applicable federal legislation). See note 56 infra.
26. See generally notes 42-69 & accompanying text infra.
27. A state may also be made an unwilling appellee, if it instituted the suit in the
first instance and won, provided that the subject matter of the dispute is en-
compassed by article MI. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
Certain language in the opinion indicates that, because the plaintiff's claim
was one under federal law, the state had waived its immunity by adopting a
Constitution which generally placed such claims within the judicial power of
[Vol. 59:246
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Court2 8 and the United States may sue a state there or else-
where.29 Both types of suits fall within the judicial power of the
United States as defined by article I, which extends that power to
"Controversies between two or more States" and "Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party."30 Article I could cer-
tainly be read to constitute consent by the signatories to the cases
confided by it to the federal judiciary. Under this interpretation,
the states would have specifically waived any prior immunity. Al-
though this approach most closely parallels that utilized in Hall, as
it depends upon express rather than implicit constitutional com-
mands, it nonetheless presupposes the existence of immunity
which, absent waiver, would bar the suit. If that immunity is
grounded in the common law, immunity could not protect a state
from suit in the courts of another state. The common law recog-
nized immunity of the sovereign in its own courts; it did not pro-
tect the sovereign in another's courts. In the latter instance,
immunity is a function of comity or of constitutional law. Yet if
states' immunity is grounded in the Constitution, Hall limited this
immunity to suits commenced in a federal court.
Reliance upon the express language of article III, however, is
misplaced. In Chisholm v. Georgia,31 the Supreme Court permit-
ted a South Carolina plaintiff to sue Georgia to recover upon a
debt, quoting article Il's extension of the judicial power to contro-
versies between a state and citizens of another state. Justification
for the abandonment of immunity was found in the abandonment
of the distinction between sovereign and subject. Chisolm was
overruled by the eleventh amendment,32 and the Court no longer
the federal government. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Furthermore, the Court
stated that the eleventh amendment failed to bar the claim, since that
amendment was to be confined to its language. Only at the end of the opinion
did the Court indicate the difference between a suit commenced against a
state and one in which the state is only the appellee. To allow review of a
decision in favor of the state is not to permit a demand to be brought against
that state. Nonetheless, it is clearly this last distinction which continues to
justify the result in Cohens; courts later rejected the general immunity lan-
guage as unnecessary in light of the availability of such relief in England,
where it is not thought to indicate any concomitant ability to initiate suit
against the sovereign. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
28. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S.
574 (1922); Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918); Kansas v. Colorado,
185 U.S. 125 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois & Chicago Dist., 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
29. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965). The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over controversies between two states is original and exclu-
sive; over controversies between the United States and a state, its jurisdiction
is original but not exclusive. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a) (1) & (b) (2) (1976).
30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
31. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
32. See note 25 supra.
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attempts to read article III as a grant of jurisdiction over claims not
traditionally justiciable. 33 Therefore, recourse is had to the "plan
of Convention" to permit a state or the United States to bring suit
against an unconsenting state.3 Although the language of article
I does not constitute a waiver of immunity, such a waiver can,
and must, in these two instances, be inferred from the constitu-
tional structure. To disallow suits between states would leave
them without a remedy against each other-, force being obviously
inconsistent with union. Jurisdiction over claims against a state
brought by the United States must be implied from the constitu-
tional plan, which postulates a federal authority supreme in its
sphere and necessarily capable of enforcing that supremacy.3 5 To
the extent the Court continues to discuss the language of article I
in these contexts, it is expressing concern not with the immunity
of the defendant and its waiver, but with other issues of jus-
ticiability presented by the claim.36
33. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
34. Id. at 322-23 (quoting THE FEDERAuST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.
1961)).
35. Id. The plan of union, however, did not involve a waiver of the states' immu-
nity to suits by foreign nations, even though such claims are also recited in
article II as being within the federal judicial power. The fabric of govern-
ment does not demand that such claims be cognizable in any court, and in-
deed such jurisdiction might conflict with the foreign relations authority of
the federal government. Id.
36. Although article III places no express restraint on the type of claims between
the states which may be heard by it, the Court, focusing on the implications
of the "controversy" requirement of article III, has continually refused to
hear any claim which does not arise directly between the states. Boundary
disputes are one obvious example of claims which do arise directly between
the states, see, e.g., Ohio v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 558 (1980); Michigan v. Wis-
consin, 272 U.S. 398 (1926); Oklahoma v. Texas, 272 U.S. 21 (1926); Georgia v.
South Carolina, 257 U.S. 516 (1922); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158
(1918), but jurisdiction is not confined to such situations. Louisiana v. Texas,
176 U.S. 1 (1900). If the suit is for an injury to one state by another state in its
quasi-sovereign capacity, it represents an interest of the state independent of
that of individual citizens, and may be pursued. North Dakota v. Minnesota,
263 U.S. 365 (1923); Missouri v. Illinois & Chicago Dist., 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
Provided that the state is seeking to represent a "considerable portion" of its
citizenry, its own interest exists, but the assignment to it of individual griev-
ances is insufficient. See notes 102-05 & accompanying text infra. Compare
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) with New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108
U.S. 76 (1883). Note that the same argument was made in the context of a suit
brought by the United States; the Court agreed without comment that if the
federal government had no real and direct interest in the suit, it could not be
maintained, but found, on the facts of the case, that such an interest did exist.
United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926). In both situations, the fact
that the individuals represented could not sue is irrelevant to jurisdiction.
Finally, once such jurisdiction attaches, it carries with it all the normal inci-
dents of jurisdiction. For example, the Court has the power to enforce its
orders, Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918), and can consider claims
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The Court rejected waivers of immunity based upon specific
constitutional language at the same time it was refusing to confine
successful claims of immunity to such language. For example, the
eleventh amendment by its terms only protects states from suits
brought in law or equity by citizens of other states or of foreign
countries, 37 though suits brought in federal court by their own citi-
zens are barred,3 8 as are those brought by a federal corporation3 9
and those which invoke the admiralty jurisdiction.40
The Court does not rest its conclusion upon constitutional lan-
guage when it finds jurisdiction over a state in the federal courts or
when it denies jurisdiction. Yet the Court concentrated on the
lack of such language rather than on the "plan of Convention"
when it denied immunity in Hall. It also restricted what constitu-
tional language there is to the situations therein expressly cov-
ered. Both article III and the eleventh amendment address federal
rather than state judicial power and were thus irrelevant to the
Hall issue.4 1
It is clear after Hall that states are not constitutionally immune
from suit in the courts of other states; extension of protection to
them is discretionary with the forum. Whether states are constitu-
tionally immune from suits in the federal courts, however, or
whether their protection there too is only that protection granted
by the common law, is still in dispute. The logic of an immunity
constitutionally commanded in only one system depends upon the
rationale given for its existence in that system.42 However, even if
parallel rules are used in both systems, parallel results need not
necessarily follow. Unless its efficacy is destroyed or modified by
the Constitution, the common law may shield a state from suit in
the federal courts, though it is insufficient to shield the state from
suit in another state.
Ratification of the Constitution deprived the states of their prior
status as sovereign nations. 4 3 It is possible that the document did
of individuals to property exclusively under the Court's control, although
such claims would ordinarily be precluded by sovereign immunity.
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
37. See note 25 supra.
38. Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920) (requesting injunctive relief); Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (requesting damages).
39. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
40. Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
41. 440 U.S. at 421-23.
42. See notes 65-69 & accompanying text infra.
43. "All the rights of the States as independent nations were surrendered to the
United States. The States are not nations, either as between themselves or
towards foreign nations. They are sovereign within their spheres, but their
sovereignty stops short of nationality." New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S.
76, 90 (1883).
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not cloak them with any new immunity. Indeed, it may have af-
fected the common law immunity which they previously enjoyed
as nations.4 4 Under this theory, neither article III nor the eleventh
amendment addresses the issue of immunity; article III does not
codify or deny it, and the eleventh amendment simply restores the
status quo as of the time the Constitution was adopted.45 Other
constitutional provisions, however, are cited as containing agreed-
to waivers of common law immunity. Article I, section 8 enumer-
ates areas in which Congress may legislate, and the grant of au-
thority is read to encompass also the federal authority to
legislatively subject a state to suit.46 The states consented to suits
on congressionally created causes of action by their adoption of
the Constitution and, therefore, cannot be heard to claim an immu-
nity properly "lifted" by Congress. 47 Note, however, that this the-
ory would support jurisdiction over a state on a claim based on a
congressionally created cause of action even if the plaintiff were
from a different state and the suit was, therefore, within the pre-
cise language of the eleventh amendment. That amendment only
precludes the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over a
state in reliance upon a waiver contained in article III, by denying
the existence of such a waiver. It does not affect the waiver of im-
munity culled from article I. The case is within the federal judicial
power because it "arises under the . . . laws . . .of the United
States;" 48 it is justiciable because of the state's consent derived
from ratification of article I.
The theory permits suits to be brought against states in both
federal and state courts. In the one, common law immunity was
waived; in the other, it is irrelevant. However, even if sovereign
immunity is derived solely from the common law, it does not nec-
essarily follow that article I, any more than article I, constitutes
an irrevocable waiver of that immunity. Just as article I has been
interpreted to allow certain claims to be heard if such claims are
44. Field, supra note 2, at 520.
45. Under this theory, the refusal of the Court in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), to permit a citizen to sue his own state for its alleged impairment of
contract in violation of the Constitution was based not on any constitutional
infirmity but rather on the retained common law immunity of the state, which
had not been changed by either the contract clause or congressional legisla-
tion. See Field, supra note 10, at 1218-80.
46. Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); Mills Music, Inc.
v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979); Field, supra note 10.
47. Apparently Justice Brennan would take this logic one step further and hold
that article I abolishes immunity in the situations to which it applies. While
Congress needs to act to create a cause of action, it need not act again to "lift"
immunity. Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 300 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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otherwise known to the law, so could article I be interpreted to al-
low certain causes of action to be congressionally created if such
causes of action are otherwise proper. The question in each case
would be twofold: does the federal legislation attempt to create a
right of action against the state, and, if so, has the state in some
way waived its common law immunity. Only if both questions are
answered affirmatively could a suit proceed, even though the
state's immunity is not constitutionally based. The Court adopted
a similar rationale to explain the United States' ability to seek to
overturn a state plan which allegedly precluded persons from vot-
ing on the ground of race in the context of the fifteenth amend-
ment.4 9 Congressional legislation authorizing such a suit was a
valid exercise of its power under the second section of the amend-
ment, and, since the suit was prosecuted by the United States, the
state was unprotected by immunity.5 0
It is true the Court subsequently indicated that, when a Civil
War amendment is involved, a state's immunity cannot prevent a
suit against it pursuant to congressional legislation, even if the suit
is brought by an individual. The thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments provide that Congress shall have power to
enforce their provisions by appropriate legislation, and all contain
specific restrictions on state action. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,5 1 the
49. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965). While the legislation in-
volved specifically authorized such a suit, the opinion made it clear that it
was the nature of the plaintiff and not the congressional act which justified
the suit. Id. at 140-41.
50. See also United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). The suit was an
attempt to recover a statutory penalty for violations of the Federal Safety
Appliance Act by a state-owned railroad. The Act, the Court found, did cover
the railroad, and the coverage was upheld:
[W] e think it unimportant to say whether the state conducts its rail-
road in its 'sovereign' or in its 'private' capacity. That in operating its
railroad it is acting within a power reserved to the states cannot be
doubted. The only question we need consider is whether the exer-
cise of that power, in whatever capacity, must be in subordination to
the power to regulate interstate commerce, which has been granted
specifically to the national government. The sovereign power of the
states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power
to the federal government in the Constitution.
Id. at 183-84 (citations omitted). Since the plaintiff was the United States, it
was unnecessary to determine whether the state's immunity was likewise di-
minished. The same logic bolstered the majority's holding in Employees v.
Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). Although an employee was
barred by immunity from suing the state under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, title IV,
§ 906(b), 86 Stat. 375 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.)), the legisla-
tive provision permitting such suits by the Secretary of Labor provided a
remedy for violations of the Act while at the same time raising no problem of
immunity.
51. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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Court held that the fourteenth amendment constituted a limitation
on state sovereign immunity as expressed in the eleventh amend-
ment; its adoption signified consent to suits congressionally cre-
ated pursuant to it.52 However, it does not necessarily follow that a
waiver of immunity in article I ought to be found simply because
the Court found a waiver of immunity in Fitzpatrick. The restric-
tions upon state action in the fourteenth amendment are expressly
stated, as is the congressional power of enforcement. Article I, sec-
tion 8, however, only grants Congress the power to legislate in des-
ignated areas. Although the supremacy clause makes state
activity in those areas subject to congressional legislation,5 3 sec-
tion 8 does not forbid any kind of activity by the states absent such
legislation. It is section 10 of article I which speaks in language
similar to that of the fourteenth amendment:5 4 to the extent that
the restrictions there imposed make no reference to congressional
authority, even they may be insufficient to constitute a waiver of
common law immunity5 5 Only when clauses prohibit state activ-
52. The Court, however, has been reluctant to hold that Congress intended to
permit private suits under other fourteenth amendment legislation. Thus, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) was recently found not to be intended to overturn tradi-
tional immunity, even though the same section does permit suits to be
brought against municipalities. Compare Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)
with Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This reluc-
tance is similar to that expressed by the Court in the context of legislation
pursuant to article I, where the authority to "lift" immunity is less clear. See,
e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees v. Missouri Pub.
Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
53. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
54. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Pay-
ment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
55. Justice Brennan argued that only this conclusion logically supports the
Court's opinion in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Employees v. Mis-
souri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 319-20 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
He was opposed by Justices Marshall and Stewart, who assumed that a self-
executing clause, such as the contract clause, must imply at least the same
power of enforcement as do other clauses, such as those contained in section
8 of article I, which are not self-executing. In their view, the adoption of the
contract clause, as well as section 8, constituted a waiver of common law im-
munity; therefore, contrary to Justice Brennan, the refusal of jurisdiction in
Hans must have rested upon constitutionally compelled immunity.
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ity without congressional approval56 is it clear that Congress may
condition the state's activity upon waiver of its immunity from re-
lated suits. 57 If both restrictive language and congressional au-
thority are necessary to imply waiver of immunity, section 8 does
not support the implication but provides only the authority.
If article I only constitutes an agreement by the states that Con-
gress may legislate in the listed areas, the Supreme Court's contin-
uing concern with the existence of a state's consent is
understandable.5 8 So too is the Court's apparently growing con-
cern with the nature of the activity which Congress has attempted
to regulate.5 9 If a state could reasonably decide not to operate in a
regulated area, it may be assumed that activity constitutes consent
to the regulation and, therefore, waiver of immunity. However, if
the nature of the activity is such that a state either could not easily
discontinue it or is under a quasi-governmental requirement to
maintain it, then continued activity can hardly be equated with
any actual waiver.6 0
Even if the common law is the only source of a state's immunity
in federal court, as it is the source of immunity in the courts of
another state, that immunity is not necessarily functionally use-
56. For example, "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty
of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in Time of Peace, enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or en-
gage in War .... " U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
57. Thus, states may not compact with each other absent the agreement of Con-
gress, id., and Congress may, therefore, condition its consent on the waiver of
immunity. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). It
should be noted that Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker, dissenting,
indicated some doubt about not the power of Congress to impose such a re-
striction but its propriety. Since the required consent was designed to pro-
tect national interests, waiver of traditional tort immunity was a condition
not geared to the purpose of the provision and ought not, therefore, be as-
sumed to have been intended.
58. See Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 281 (1973). Unfor-
tunately, this case, as did Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), substan-
tially confuses the issue by discussing whether congressional action has
"lifted" what the Court refers to as "constitutional immunity." 411 U.S. at 285.
The question is a contradiction in terms. Professor Field has suggested that
the Court may be willing to equate continued activity in a regulated area with
consent, once congressional intent to force such a choice on the states is
found. Field, supra note 10, at 1214 passim. This admittedly avoids the other-
wise difficult issue of what constitutes consent, but unless the legislation con-
fers some benefit, it is equally difficult to find authority to impose the
condition of waiver. Id.
59. See Field, supra note 10, at 1218-80.
60. Compare Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (operation of railroad
begun after passage of regulatory legislation) with Employees v. Missouri
Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (operation of hospital continued but not
begun after passage of regulatory legislation).
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less in the federal system.61 However, it is likely that a majority of
the Supreme Court would hold in the federal context that state
immunity is a constitutionally compelled doctrine.6 2 The Court
agrees that the eleventh amendment places some constitutional
restraint on the assumption of unconsented-to jurisdiction.63 If a
case falls within the specific language of the amendment, consent
is a precondition for a justiciable controversy. Only one member
of the Court, Justice Brennan, clearly rejects such a restraint in all
other cases.64 His view is opposed by Justice Marshall, for whom
the immunity of the states is a constitutional right within the fed-
eral system. 65 Justice Marshall, however, did join with the major-
ity in Hall, thus indicating that he takes the opposite view if
litigation is commenced in the state. This duality is a result of his
belief in the dual source of the doctrine. To the extent that the
61. To confine the source of a state's immunity to the common law does resolve
three problems. The language of the eleventh amendment is extraordinarily
narrow if it was intended to codify immunity. If, on the other hand, it only
denies an assumption of jurisdiction based upon an implied waiver of immu-
nity in article III, it addresses properly the only issue presented. Other cases
brought within the judicial power by that article depend for their characteri-
zation on the nature of the dispute, not of the parties, and so contain no impli-
cation of waiver of immunity. Second, the theory explains why consent of a
state is sufficient to permit suit to be brought against it in the federal court,
even when the suit precisely fits the prohibitory language of the amendment.
The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal system is limited by the Consti-
tution and generally cannot be expanded by consent-yet no one doubts the
efficacy of such consent here. If the amendment, however, only precludes
courts from removing common law immunity pursuant to article I, then con-
sent places the suit within that article as a justiciable claim. Finally, the the-
ory justifies language in various cases, supra note 58, concerning whether
Congress has "lifted" a state's immunity. Field, supra note 2, at 544-45.
62. Of course, if there is a constitutional guarantee of immunity, the argument of
an implied waiver of that immunity in article I becomes difficult to sustain.
The waiver could logically be implied from one of the Civil War amendments
because, to the extent the eleventh amendment is the source or at least the
expression of the constitutional guarantee, it could have been modified by
the passage of the subsequent amendments. It does, however, postdate arti-
cle I, which could, therefore, not reasonably modify whatever immunity the
eleventh amendment exemplifies.
Thus far, only one circuit has expressly held that, in accord with the Field
theory, action by Congress pursuant to one of the article I enumerated pow-
ers is sufficient to preclude an immunity defense, even if the state has not
consented to be sued (except through implication by ratification of the Con-
stitution). Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979). See Peal
v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
63. Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973); Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 150 (1908); Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591 (1904).
64. Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 299-324 (1973) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 290-93 (Marshall, J., concurring) (joined by Stewart, J.).
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state claims immunity as a common law right, Justice Marshall ar-
gues that article I constitutes a waiver of the immunity such that
Congress may "lift" it by legislation. Thus, for example, he main-
tains that it is possible to compel a state to open its own courts to a
congressionally created claim against it; in the state systems, the
only source of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is the common
law.66 However, article IlI elevates sovereign immunity in the fed-
eral system to a constitutional level and thus there precludes
claims against unconsenting states. 67 The eleventh amendment is
considered merely a narrow and clarifying expression of a much
broader doctrine implicit in article III. Since three members of the
Court (the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist)
dissented in Hall upon an express finding that immunity is a con-
stitutional doctrine even in the state systems, at least four mem-
bers of the Court would presumably hold that consent is necessary
before a state may be forced to defend or default in a federal court.
If another justice joins these four,68 the result will be precisely the
kind of dual immunity which Justice Marshall has sought.
If the Constitution grants the states immunity from suits
against them only when such suits are commenced in the federal
courts, it is logically necessary to focus upon article III as Justice
Marshall does. Article Ill and the eleventh amendment address
only the judicial power of the United States. Any implicit restric-
tions which they contain, therefore, can apply only to that power,
66. Id. See also Douglas v. New Haven R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929).
67. Reading article 1M as affecting, by implication, the common law powers of the
states is not without precedent. In New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76
(1883), the Court held that the article had deprived the states of at least one
previously existing right of a sovereign: to sue on behalf of its individual citi-
zens. New Hampshire law, in an attempt to circumvent the eleventh amend-
ment, permitted the Attorney General to sue on behalf of the state's citizens
to collect debts owed them by other states. The litigation was paid for and
controlled by the individual claimants, the state acting as a collecting agent
but authorized to bring suit in its own name. When suit was brought against
Louisiana, the Court found that it was barred by article IIL though not by
sovereign immunity. Reasoning that the article originally contemplated a di-
rect remedy for an aggrieved citizen, permitting him to sue another state di-
rectly, the Court held that the grant of that remedy "was equivalent to taking
away any indirect remedy he might otherwise have claimed, through the in-
tervention of his State, upon any principle of the law of nations." Id. at 91.
Even though the eleventh amendment deprived the individual of his special
remedy, it did not re-vest the traditional one; the "controversy" created by
state law was not, therefore, one within the scope of article III. See note 36
supra.
Although Justice Marshall's theory entails an implicit verification of a
traditional right rather than an implicit deprivation of one, the same reason-
ing which supported the New Hampshire result would support his theory.
68. Justice Stewart, who joined Justice Marshall's concurrence in Employees, is
the obvious choice. See note 55 supra.
1980l
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
leaving untouched the authority of a state court to entertain a
claim against another state. However, if, as the Hall dissenters ar-
gued, state immunity is an unarticulated but binding assumption
drawn from the Constitution as a whole, the distinction between
suits in federal and state courts is not justifiable. While it is likely
that a majority of the Court would hold immunity to be a constitu-
tional right in the federal system, it is also likely that they would
not agree on the means of reaching that result.
III. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
As Nevada, sued in the California courts against its will, could
thus not assert sovereign immunity as an implicit constitutional
right, it was necessary for the Court to find some specific constitu-
tional clause which compelled recognition of the doctrine. The full
faith and credit clause 69 was, therefore, claimed to require Califor-
nia to utilize Nevada law.7 0 That law did permit the state to be
made a defendant on certain causes of action, including the one
brought by Hall, but only in the state courts of Nevada and only for
damages not in excess of $25,000. The California court found the
Nevada waiver irrelevant in light of its own policy, interests and
statutes 71 and the Supreme Court agreed. Citing prior decisions 72
for the proposition that "the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
require a State to apply another State's law in violation of its own
legitimate public policy, ' ' 73 the Court found that California had a
legitimate interest in providing its residents with a forum and re-
fused constitutionally to limit California's choice of applicable
law.74
69. See note 21 supra.
70. See note 8 supra.
71. Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d 522, 526, 503 P.2d 1363, 1366, 105 Cal. Rptr.
355, 358 (1972).
72. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Bonaparte v. Tax
Court, 104 U.S. 592 (1881).
73. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 422.
74. Recently, one commentator has argued forcefully that due process as well as
the full faith and credit clause limits the choice of law options of a state.
Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law,
62 CoRu-LL L REV. 94 (1976). Beginning with the idea that due process ex-
presses concern not only with fundamental fairness but also with territorial
limitations on the state, see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958), Kirgis
maintains that both elements of the concept restrain the forum's choice of
law. Thus, "[ilf the rule the state seeks to impose applies to an event within
the state's territory, or to a person who has some relatively stable relation-
ship with the state (such as residence, domicile, or place of business), an
observable link exists to justify the exercise of power" by the forum neces-
sary to the use of its own laws. Kirgis, supra, at 97. Such use then accords
with due process unless it would be "manifestly unfair to the party resisting
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A. The Constitution
The validity of the Court's holding depends in part upon how
it." Id. at 103. Activity in the forum related to the cause of action precludes
that unfairness; absent such activity, the unfairness results if either (1) no
benefit is derived; (2) no benefit was expected to be derived and the defend-
ant's contact with the state was not foreseeable, or (3) the severity of the
forum law is out of proportion to an expected benefit actually derived. Id. at
103-04. Governmental interests of the forum are irrelevant here; the key is a
nexus between the state and the party resisting its law sufficient to make
application of that law fair.
The logic of the restriction thus imposed on a state's choice of law is re-
markably parallel to that restricting its exercise of personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant. In Hanson, as a result of the territorial limitation
which the Court found inherent in due process, the Court also held that, in
order to satisfy the clause, jurisdiction had to be based on "some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." 357 U.S. at 253. The test is easy enough to apply to a defendant who
actually comes into the state and acts there, either in person or through an
agent, in such a manner as to give rise to the claim brought against him.
Many states have codified the jurisdictional results of such activity in their
"long-arm" statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. [Crv. PRAC.] LAW § 302(a) (1972). How-
ever, even as to a nonresident who never enters the state, jurisdiction may be
taken if he, in effect, complies with Kirgis' above analysis. For example, a
product which causes injury in the forum, although not manufactured there
or sold directly by the defendant to anyone in the state, may expose the man-
ufacturer to jurisdiction if he obtained benefits indirectly from the state and
the presence of the product in the state was foreseeable. See Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961). Of course, "stable relationships" with the state have long been suffi-
cient to satisfy jurisdictional requirements.
The Court in Hall made no mention of due process, and, on the facts, had
no need to do so. See note 17 & accompanying text supra. All parties agreed
that the employee-driver had been acting in the scope of his employment
and, therefore, as an agent of Nevada when the accident occurred. Absent
the unique status of the defendant, there would have been no jurisdictional
dispute, and due process could have placed no restriction on California's
choice of law. If an attempt is made to exert that jurisdiction over another
state in a different context, however, due process might well become relevant.
Assume that activity in State X by State X causes damage to privately-owned
property in State Y. State Y cannot maintain suit on behalf of its citizens to
redress their individual injuries, see note 36 supra, but after Hall, it is possi-
ble that the citizens themselves could sue in State Y. But once a determina-
tion is made that jurisdiction over the defendant comports with due process,
it is inevitable that the law of State Ywill apply. The utility of due process as
a constraint on choice of law is most apparent when, as in Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), jurisdiction over the defendant is quasi-in-rem,
based upon the presence of its property in the forum rather than on any con-
tacts between the defendant and the forum related to the cause of action.
However, subsequent to Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), such jurisdic-
tion no longer meets the requirements of due process. All jurisdiction must
be based upon contacts (or, presumably, stable relationships), and so Kirgis'
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the Nevada statute is interpreted. To the extent that it provides for
and limits the personal jurisdiction which the state courts may ex-
ercise, it is irrelevant to a defendant sued in another state. So long
as jurisdiction comports with due process, it may be exercised in
the discretion of the forum state.75 To the extent that the statute
attempts to confine causes of action there created to a single court,
the general efficacy of such an attempt has previously been denied
by the Court:
The courts of the sister State trying the case would be bound to give
full faith and credit to all those substantial provisions of the statute which
inhered in the cause of action or which name conditions on which the
right to sue depend. But venue is no part of the right; and a State cannot
create a transitory cause of action and at the same time destroy the right
to sue on that transitory cause of action in any court having jurisdiction.
That jurisdiction is to be determined by the law of the court's creation and
cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a statute of another
State, even though it created the right of action.
7 6
However, when waiver of immunity is necessary to the creation of
a cause of action, precisely such confinement has been upheld. A
waiver with respect to claims brought against a state in its own
courts does not necessarily encompass, and may properly exclude,
jurisdiction over the same claims in federal court.77 Of course, to
the extent immunity from suit in the federal system is a constitu-
tional right,78 a denial of consent by the defendant prevents the
claim from becoming constitutionally justiciable. A state is free in
that context to deny consent for whatever reason it chooses; simi-
lar freedom may not necessarily be granted to the states on the
Hall facts. Nonetheless, the fact that such limitations are treated
differently when they arise in a statute waiving immunity indicates
analysis will necessarily be used in the jurisdictional context. Cf. note 12
supra (analysis of non-resident motorist statutes).
75. See note 74 supra.
76. Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354,360 (1914). See also Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 71 (1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting; McKenna, J.,
concurring in dissent) (arguing that any conditions placed by the creating
state on a cause of action, made absolute and precedent to recovery, must be
complied with before a right to that recovery exists). Cf. Galveston, H. & S.A.
Ry. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481,490 (1912) (" [w]here the statute creating the right
provides an exclusive remedy, to be enforced in a particular way, or before a
special tribunal, the aggrieved party will be left to the remedy given by the
statute which created the right." (emphasis added)). Since the Galveston
holding caused the Court no qualms in George and postdated Sowers, per-
haps the Court meant its language to address claims confided to tribunals
other than courts of general jurisdiction.
77. See Great N. Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944) (expressly distinguishing
cases such as those discussed in note 72 supra); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436
(1900) (same).
78. See notes 61-65 & accompanying text supra.
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that reliance ought not to be placed automatically upon case law
generated by claims arising between individuals.
In any event, the Nevada statute, as it was attempted to be used
in Hall, is best characterized not as imposing jurisdictional restric-
tions, but as providing two defenses to the plaintiffs' claim: sover-
eign immunity would continue to preclude any suit not within the
literal terms of the statute, and a verdict on the claim could in no
event exceed $25,000. The policies of California and Nevada were
clearly opposed with respect to the second defense. Nevada re-
stricted recoveries against it, California did not.79 It is not surpris-
ing that the Court found no impediment to the use of California's
policy. Assuming that an action could be maintained in California
at all, there would be no basis to hold that a foreign state's limita-
tion on such actions in that state governs California's own defini-
tion of its cause of action.80 Even when the plaintiff's claim is
based upon the foreign law which contains the limitation, at least
one state refuses to recognize that limit in its damage awards.8 1
79. 440 U.S. at 424.
80. The situation is somewhat analoguous to that presented in three cases in-
volving fraternal benefit societies. Order of Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586
(1947); Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Royal Arcanum v.
Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915). In each, forum beneficiaries claimed against the
company, relying on an aspect of forum law; each was met by a defense based
on contradictory rules of the foreign society permitted under its incorporat-
ing laws; each was resolved in favor of the society. Thus, limitations on the
claim could not be changed by reference to a separate body of law. See Mar-
tin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice ofLaw, 61 CoRNEi.L L REV. 185, 186-
230 (1976). See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924). But see
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). Of course, in all these cases only
one state could provide the cause of action.
The Supreme Court has permitted reference to the forum's statute of limi-
tations, even when the forum is asked to enforce a foreign cause of action and
the foreign statute has not yet run. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S.
514 (1953). It has been suggested that the forum ought not be permitted to
"revive" a foreign cause of action by using its own longer statute of limita-
tions at least unless the forum could apply its own substantive law to the
claim. Martin, supra, at 223. The broad language of the Court in Wells does
not support this distinction, 345 U.S. at 517, nor does the opinion of the Court
in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964). In Clay, a Florida resident
was permitted to sue in Florida for an insured loss which occurred in Florida
more than one year after the cause of action arose, even though the contract,
valid where made, precluded suit after one year. Compare Clay with Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (court refused to permit a similar suit
when the insured-against loss did not occur in the forum). Cf. Martin, supra,
at 215 (explaining the two holdings as consistent). It is a much different thing
to compel the forum to borrow foreign law to change a claim created by its
own properly applicable substantive law than it is to permit the forum's stat-
ute to govern a foreign claim, whatever the rationale for permitting the latter.
81. Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973); Pearson v. Northeast Air-
lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962); Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183
N.E.2d 902 (1962); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d
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Whether the action could be maintained in California or rather
whether the Nevada statute created an exclusive cause of action, is
the more basic and more confusing issue. Prior decisions of the
Court in the area of workmen's compensation have made it clear
that more than one state may have connections with a single trans-
action sufficient to permit them to apply their own law. If an em-
ployment contract, for example, is entered into in State X and a
related injury occurs in State Y, the employee may claim against
his employer in either state under the law of the forum.8 2 Thus,
setting aside the issue of sovereign immunity, the fact of injury in
California to California residents by activity in that state would
certainly be sufficient to permit the application of California law in
California.83 Indeed, putting aside the question of immunity, it
could be argued that if the plaintiff sued in Nevada, Nevada would
have been compelled to refer to California law. Nevada's only con-
tact with the claim is the citizenship of the defendant; California's
strong interest in the protection of its citizens remains the same.84
Sovereign immunity, however, does distinguish the preceding
hypothetical from other full faith and credit cases. California's in-
terest is admittedly unchanged by the nature of the defendant, but
Nevada's is not. The interest of Nevada is not in the substantive
law of negligence to be applied to determine liability; it is in the
availability of a defense based upon its sovereign status. It is diffi-
526 (1961). All four suits involved the death in Massachusetts of a New York
citizen and a subsequent claim in New York courts under the Massachusetts
wrongful death act. Massachusetts limited recovery pursuant to its wrongful
death act; New York law contained no such limitation on claims it created.
The strength of New York's policy overrode the limit, aided in Kilberg by a
definition of the limit as "procedural," and in Pearson by the rationale that,
since New York could have itself created a cause of action for the plaintiff, it
could judicially borrow as much or as little of Massachusetts law as it chose.
See Martin, supra note 76, at 223-27. Compare Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R.,
194 U.S. 120 (1904) (disallowing a lump sum award for wrongful death on
claim brought in Texas pursuant to Mexican statute creating a civil remedy
but confining it to damages in the nature of alimony, which the Texas court
could not give at common law) with Stewart v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 168 U.S.
445, 448 (1897).
82. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Co., 330 U.S.
469 (1947); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939)
(state where injury occurred may apply its law); Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (same). Compare id. with Bradford Elec. Co.
v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
83. See also Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
84. On the other hand, the Court is demonstrably reluctant to forbid reference to
forum law, and Nevada might well claim an interest in protecting its treasury,
one which is sufficient to justify use of its own law. See, e.g., Lilienthal v.
Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964) (voiding the contract of an Oregon
spendthrift which was validly entered into and to be performed in Califor-
nia).
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cult to conceive of any other state with a comparable interest in
Nevada's immunity. If the claim had been brought in Nevada, the
state courts surely would have followed the requirements of Ne-
vada law with respect to waiver of immunity, whether or not they
applied California's law to determine negligence. According to
state law, they would have lacked jurisdiction to do anything else.
Since the claim involved was one based on common law, no federal
authority would be sufficient to "lift" immunity, and the full faith
and credit clause would be inapplicable: no California statute does,
or could logically, speak to the immunity of another state in that
state's courts. The Hall majority, however, reached its conclusion
with no reference to the interests of either California or Nevada in
Nevada's sovereign immunity.
The extent to which either prior case law or the purpose of the
full faith and credit clause compels a consideration of Nevada's in-
terest is unclear. It is not disputed that the clause embodies con-
cepts of mutual respect among sovereigns and some degree of
deference to their legitimate interests. 85 Although early language
of the Court indicated that only by balancing conflicting interests
could a determination be made,86 subsequent opinions severely
weakened that indication, focusing only on the legitimacy of the
forum's interest.87 But it is possible that that legitimacy may itself
be affected by the interests of another state. Thus, while rejecting
85. See Martin, supra note 80, at 186, Kirgis, supra note 74, at 110-11.
86. [T]he conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the
full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to
subordinate its own statutes to those of the other, but by appraising
the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale
of decision according to their weight.
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Commission, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). See also State
Farm Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945).
87. See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). Pro-
fessor Martin has suggested that this focus on the legitimacy of the forum's
interest ought to be "confined to cases in which there is a clear critical event
within the state whose law is being applied." Martin, supra note 80, at 201.
Otherwise, there is a need to weigh the strengths and legitimacy of that inter-
est against those of other states. Thus, a forum
may apply its law to a case whenever (a) the party resisting applica-
tion of that law has acted in the state or derived relatively direct ben-
efits from the forum, or (b) there is some weaker connection between
the defendant and the forum, and the forum's interests are relatively
strong compared to the interests of other states that would be dis-
served by the application of forum law.
Id. at 211. However, even using this approach it would not be necessary to
consider Nevada's interest on the Hall facts; the defendant had acted in Cali-
fornia through an agent and therefore only that state's interests need by con-
sidered. It would be permissible to refer to Nevada's interests if injury in
California had been caused indirectly by activity in Nevada.
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any balancing of interests, one commentator has suggested other
limitations on a forum's use of its own law8 8 and has justified both
the existence of the proposed limitations and their relatively nar-
row scope as follows:
Unless a forum state directly challenges the requirements of federal-
ism. . . , one must clearly identify the other state or states having an in-
terest and determine the extent of the insult they would suffer from
having their law ignored. The problem is more difficult than with full faith
and credit to judgments, where the focus on, and sensitivity of, the render-
ing state is clear. Something must take the place of the judgment to pro-
vide the necessary focus on the law of a particular state, unless the case
involves a significant question of nationwide harmony. Moreover, unless a
failure to defer to a given state's law would represent a clear slap in the
face to that state or to the federal system itself, the full faith and credit
clause and the Supreme Court simply cannot assume the day-to-day task
of sorting out the provincialism still at large.89
If sovereign immunity of one state in the courts of another is not a
"requirement of federalism" because it is not constitutionally com-
pelled, it does at least involve a "significant question of nationwide
harmony." Furthermore, the "focus on and sensitivity of" Nevada
in these circumstances is certainly as great as with respect to a
Nevada judgment, and to force an unconsenting sovereign to ac-
88. (A) The forum state cannot devise a policy or rule for a particu-
lar case or discrete class of cases that defeats a claim for relief or a
defense created by the law... of another state whose law the forum
would apply under its normal choice-of-law approach. Thus:
(1) It cannot refuse to provide a forum for adjudication of a
transitory dispute arising out of an occurrence or relationship in
another state, solely because it arose in another state or solely as
a subterfuge for some disguised policy applicable to the merits of
the dispute. It may, however, refuse to provide a forum if its re-
fusal would effectuate a genuine policy for the orderly adminis-
tration of justice or a genuine moral standard it considers
fundamental-provided that its policy or standard is not so aber-
rational as to be thoroughly out of line with prevailing norms
among virtually all other states.
(2) The forum state cannot defeat an otherwise enforceable
claim or applicable defense based on another state's law by bla-
tantly manipulating its professed choice-of-law method to apply
its own law.
(B) The forum cannot choose its own law on a particular issue
when, on the specific facts:
(1) Another state has an interest in applying its law that is
overwhelming by comparison with the interest of the forum; or
(2) There is an overwhelming reason to decide all similar
claims according to one legal system, and one state other than
the forum clearly would be the bellwether.
(C) The forum cannot apply a statute of another state in a way
that seriously distorts a nondivisible statutory scheme formulated by
that state's legislature, unless the forum can justify its action by sim-
ply applying its own law to reach the same result.
Kirgis, supra note 74, at 119-20. Either (B) (1) or (2) would arguably sustain
application of Nevada's law of immunity.
89. Id. at 111 (footnotes omitted).
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cept foreign jurisdiction is equally as certain a "slap in the face."
The effect of applying the forum law, therefore, brings into ques-
tion the legitimacy of the forum's interest, which is necessary to
justify its application.
Absent some references to the interest of the state whose law is
being rejected, either by a balancing of those interests and the fo-
rum's or by considering them as affecting the legitimacy of the fo-
rum's interests, analysis under the full faith and credit clause
becomes hardly distinguishable from a jurisdictional analysis.90
Although activity in the state is used to demonstrate the state's
interest in the resulting litigation, rather than the contacts be-
tween the state and the defendant, the same activity justifies both
choice of law and jurisdiction over nonresident, nonconsenting de-
fendants. While such a result may be justifiable in other contexts,
it begs the question presented by a defense of sovereign immunity.
The issues thus raised cannot be resolved either by reference to
the interests of another state or by considering the defendant as
though it were an individual. The entire point of the defense is
that the state is not an individual but a sovereign and, as such, may
command special treatment. In light of the Court's past pro-
nouncements under the full faith and credit clause, that clause
clearly does not provide an ideal vehicle for the resolution of this
issue. But, in the absence of an implicit constitutional recognition
of the doctrine, it was the only vehicle available. Unfortunately,
the Court failed to consider to what extent its usual analysis might
need to be altered to accommodate the unique facts presented.
B. Statutory Law
The Constitution does not provide the only command to the
states that full faith and credit be given to the statutes of other
states. Congressional legislation also requires full faith and
credit.91 Originally, Congress required only that such recognition
be given to foreign judgments;92 the reason the statute was
amended is as unclear as the original reason for the limitation.93
The Court has not seemed perturbed by either version of the stat-
ute. It compelled one state to utilize the substantive law of an-
other when the statute related only to judgments;94 nowhere in
Hall does it indicate that the statute as amended affects the valid-
90. See note 70 supra.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
92. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122 (1790).
93. See Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56
MICH. L. RE V. 33 (1957); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense
of Public Policy, 19 U. CHL L. REV. 339 (1952); Sumner, The Full-Faith-and-
Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 ORE. L. REv. 224 (1955).
94. Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
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ity of holdings prior to its passage. Apparently, if Congress wishes
to demand full faith and credit for state legislation greater than
that which the Court believes to be constitutionally compelled, it
must do so specifically. While creating an entire body of conflicts
rules presents obvious problems for both Congress and the
courts, 95 drafting legislation which compels recognition of a state's
own sovereign immunity statutes would be relatively easy. It may
also be the only practical way to avoid the problems discussed be-
low, until the states themselves decide to waive their immunity in
all courts. 96
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
As already indicated, the Court's reasoning in Hall v. Nevada
permits a suit against one state, brought in another state, to be
treated more or less as is a suit against any other nonresident de-
fendant. It is possible that the nature of the defending state's ac-
tivity which gives rise to the cause of action will limit permissible
suits, but it is not necessary.97 Similarly, it is possible that con-
tacts between the defending state and the forum state that are suf-
95. See Reese, supra note 93, at 339-41.
96. Of course, it might also be thought to imply that only in the designated area
need such recognition be given. However, the constitutional provision is ar-
guably self-executing to the extent it confines the states, see note 90 & accom-
panying text supra; specific legislation would therefore only limit, not
expand, a state's ability to choose its own law. But such a result was consid-
ered by Justice Stone:
The mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as defined
by this Court may be, in some degree not yet fully defined, expanded
or contracted by Congress. Much of the confusion and procedural
deficiencies which the constitutional provision alone has not avoided
may be remedied by legislation. The Constitutional provision giving
Congress power to prescribe the effect to be given to acts, records
and proceedings would have been quite unnecessary had it not been
intended that Congress should have a latitude broader than that
given the courts by the full faith and credit clause alone. It was re-
marked on the floor of the Constitutional Convention that without
the extension of power in the legislature, the provision 'Would
amount to nothing more than what now takes place among all In-
dependent Nations.' Hunt and Scott, Madison's Reports of the De-
bates in the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 503. The play which has
been afforded for the recognition of local public policy in cases where
there is called in question only a statute of another state, as to the
effect of which Congress has not been legislated, compared with the
more restricted scope for local policy where there is a judicial pro-
ceeding, as to which Congress has legislated, suggests the Congres-
sional power.
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 n.2 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). The legislation which Congress eventually passed did
not have the effect he predicted, but it was generally drawn and since its
wording nearly parallels that of the Constitution, may properly have been
thought to add nothing to the clause.
97. See note 10 & accompanying text supra.
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ficient to obtain jurisdiction in other contexts may not be sufficient
to justify the use of forum law. This may make available the de-
fense of sovereign immunity but it is not necessary.98 If states are
to become frequent defendants in foreign courts, two issues not
addressed by the Hall majority should be considered: is another
forum or body of law available if the forum is biased, or if fear of
such bias is likely to cause discontent; and if judgment is entered
against a state which is not paid, and if the state has no property in
the forum, how, if at all, can that judgment be enforced.
Generally, a defendant sued in a state court on a claim origi-
nally cognizable in the federal system may remove the suit to a
federal court.99 Federal subject matter jurisdiction extends to
suits brought against a state by citizens of a different state,100 if the
state consents to such jurisdiction.1 1 A defending state, fearful of
bias against it in the forum, therefore has the choice of locating the
dispute in a national tribunal. However, such removal will not
change the substantive law applicable to that dispute. It has been
suggested that since the tension between the two states (the fo-
rum and the defendant) is inevitably greater here than in the ordi-
nary conflict of laws situation, and in fact more closely resembles
the tension inherent in suits between states, federal common law
rather than the law of the forum ought to govern the outcome. 0 2
The Supreme Court has held that, in disputes between states, it
sits as "an international, as well as a domestic tribunal" and so
applies "Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exi-
gencies of the particular case may demand."'103 But it is doubtful
that the Court has not felt compelled to follow state law in such
cases because of the nature of the parties before it. While the lan-
guage of article III apparently grants subject matter jurisdiction
here by reference to the status of the parties, the Court is also con-
cerned with the nature of the dispute. Only when states are in-
volved in a controversy in their quasi-sovereign capacity will the
Court find a "controversy" within the meaning of article III which
is capable of decision. 0 4 Thus it is not the tension between the
states but the lack of any single state body of law rationally capa-
98. See notes 87-89 & accompanying text supra.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
100. U.S. CONST. art. IEI § 2.
101. See note 25 & accompanying text supra.
102. Martiniak, supra note 10, at 166. Even if the states were to utilize federal
common law, lack of uniformity or clear standards would result in a continu-
ing fear of bias, so removal to the federal system would still be desirable from
the defendant's point of view. Id.
103. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1902). See also Parden v. Terminal
Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359
U.S. 275, 278-79 (1959) (indicating that whether state action constitutes a
waiver of immunity is also a federal law question).
104. See note 36 & accompanying text supra.
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ble of determining the outcome which justifies the use of federal
common law. This is consistent with the Court's holding in Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins;0 5 article I jurisdiction based upon diversity of
citizenship between the parties does not constitute a concomitant
grant of authority to the federal system to determine substantive
rules of decision for those controversies. Unless the dispute arises
under federal law or involves concerns unique to the federal sys-
tem,106 article M cannot be read to permit creation of applicable
law. In a case such as Hall, the plaintiffs' cause of action is based
upon state, not federal, law; the fact that the defendant is a state
and, therefore, capable of removing the suit to the federal system
cannot change that.
The enforcement of a judgment rendered by one state in the
courts of another 0 7 is a function of the full faith and credit clause
105. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
106. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (foreign
affairs); Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956)
(federal paper); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)
(same).
107. There is no reason why the federal courts also cannot be requested to enforce
a state judgment provided that ordinary jurisdictional requirements are met.
Personal jurisdiction must be obtained over the defendant, and Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(e) generally compels a finding of such jurisdiction in the state in which the
federal court sits. Jurisdiction should not be assumed because there is juris-
diction at the time of the original suit, but it is unclear what additional con-
tacts are required. For example, in Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir.
1974), a state counterclaim for malicious prosecution resulted in a verdict;
enforcement was allowed in a district court sitting in the state which ren-
dered the verdict although the counterclaim defendant had no contacts with
the state subsequent to the filing of the counterclaim against him. However,
the claim was for an intentional, rather than a negligent, tort; the original
contacts were continuous and systematic rather than single and isolated; and
the judgment was not "stale." While the last factor is one within the control
of the prevailing party, the first two are not. Nor are they frequently present.
If together they must be shown (in the absence of new contacts), personal
jurisdiction will rarely be found in an enfqrcement action against a nonresi-
dent defendant.
In addition, the federal court must have jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter of the action. In Threlkeld, such jurisdiction was based upon diversity of
citizenship. But unless the state consents, no such jurisdiction would exist
on facts similar to Hall; it would be barred by the eleventh amendment. See
notes 62-65 & accompanying text infra. If the original claim had been prop-
erly heard in the federal courts, the federal court would have ancillary juris-
diction to enforce the judgment. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918).
It should be noted that while suits against states in the federal system are
enforceable in the federal system, suits against states in state courts, absent
consent of the state, are not enforceable. See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Tennessee,
101 U.S. 337 (1879) (A state was permitted to repeal waiver of its immunity
which was based on a debt that accrued while the waiver was in force: there
was no impairment of contract because no "remedy" had been revoked; the
original right to sue did not encompass a right to enforce the judgment). The
distinction between waiver of immunity from liability and waiver of immu-
nity from execution is one which is also recognized in the context of suits
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of the Constitution and legislation passed pursuant to it.108 Al-
though the Court has been willing to accept numerous evasions of
the commands embodied therein when one state is asked to utilize
the law of another to determine a dispute, it has consistently up-
held the language of the clause when a judgment is brought to an-
other state for enforcement. The clause does not require that a
state treat the judgment of another state as though it were ren-
dered in the forum. 09 It does require, however, that when such a
judgment is attempted to be made a judgment of the forum, it must
be given the "same credit, validity, and effect ... which it had in
the state where it was pronounced, and that whatever pleas would
be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none others, could be
pleaded in any other court in the United States."110 Lack of either
personal jurisdiction over the defendant or subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the dispute in the rendering court will preclude enforce-
ment; in the one instance, due process compels the limitation,"1
and in the other, the judgment is void." 2 Of course, the judgment
only affects that which it decides" 3 and must be considered final
and conclusive by the rendering court."4 However, defenses to
the enforcement of a foreign judgment which are based on the un-
derlying civil' 5 cause of action inevitably fail. Thus, a judgment of
State Y, based upon a contract in State X between residents of
against the United States or against foreign nations. See generally Stewart,
The Enforcement of Judgments Against the United States, 12 CREiGnroN L.
REV. 815 (1979). With respect to suits in state court, one exception may exist;
if a state can be forced to permit a federal claim to be heard against it in its
own courts, it may also be forced to permit enforcement of any resulting judg-
ment. See note 66 & accompanying text supra.
108. See note 21 supra.
109. Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U.S. 16 (1918); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
312 (1839).
110. Hampton v. M'Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818).
111. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S.
562 (1906) (reversed on other grounds by Williams); National Exch. Bank v.
Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
112. Hodd v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915); Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 (1910);
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
113. For example, a judgment permitting a fraternal benefit society to raise its
assessments on members binds all members but does not preclude them
from raising defenses personal to themselves in suits to collect such assess-
ments. Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915). Similarly, a judgment
assessing stockholders of insolvent corporations does not prevent recourse to
personal defenses, although it does foreclose attack on the validity of the as-
sessment. Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609 (1936); Main v. Augedahl, 247 U.S.
142 (1918); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912); Hancock Nat'l Bank v.
Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900). See also Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc.,
314 U.S. 201 (1941); Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112 (1934).
114. Compare Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) with Industrial
Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
115. Judgments based on foreign penal laws are not enforceable elsewhere (Hunt-
ington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265
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that state, and illegal in State X must be enforced in State X.116
An allegation that the judgment was procured by fraud will not af-
fect its enforceability unless it was fraudulently procured accord-
ing to the law of the state rendering judgment and unless that state
would permit collateral attack of the judgment on the ground of
fraud." 7 Even though the state rendering the original judgment
would no longer allow its enforcement, if a second state has ren-
dered judgment enforcing the first judgment, that judgment itself
must be given full faith and credit in the rendering state. 118
The court requested to enforce a foreign judgment must of
course have jurisdiction to enforce it and, as a general proposition,
control of state court jurisdiction is for the state." 9 Thus, in the
Hall situation, should Nevada be requested to enforce in its own
courts the California judgment against it, Nevada's inevitable re-
sponse will be that its courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over
such a claim, not because the judgment is foreign to the forum but
because no act of the state constitutes a waiver of immunity in ac-
tions to enforce or execute a judgment rather than merely to deter-
mine liability.12 0 The success of the response will depend upon the
Court's willingness to accept the jurisdictional limitation. There
(1888)), while judgments based on tax liabilities are (Milwaukee County v.
M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935)).
116. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). It makes no difference that the ren-
dering state apparently entered the judgment based upon its misconception
of the law of the enforcing state, which it applied. See also American Express
Co. v. Mullins, 212 U.S. 311 (1909). State X would not be compelled to hear an
original claim based on such contract entered into elsewhere and legal there.
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934). Cf. Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15
(1917) (federal court sitting in Texas could enforce a contract entered into
and valid in New York, as enforcement of that contract did not violate the
public policy of Texas).
117. Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282 (1939).
118. Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928). Neither can an enforcing state refuse
to recognize a judgment based on a cause of action which arose there in reli-
ance on the fact that its statute of limitations had run on the cause when the
original suit was filed. Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866). But
see note 80 supra. Of course, a state can place a limit on the time within
which a judgment must be enforced; an early case permitted such a limit to
differ depending on whether the judgment was that of the forum or of a for-
eign state. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839). But some time
must be given.
119. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879), indicated that such control may not
encroach upon the proper jurisdiction of the United States....
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States,. . . deprive any person of his rights without due process of
law, [or] deny to any person the equal protection of the laws, includ-
ing the equal right to resort to the appropriate courts for redress.
101 U.S. at 30. In addition to the provisions mentioned, a denial of jurisdiction
which places an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce is also inva-
lid. International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
120. See note 107 supra.
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are intimations that a removal of jurisdiction may preclude en-
forcement of a judgment, at least in some circumstances, 121 but the
Court has been extraordinarily reluctant to define or find those cir-
cumstances. 122 The nature of the underlying judgment cannot be
used here to deny jurisdiction of an action to enforce it,123 nor can
jurisdictional statutes, even with respect to an original claim based
on foreign law, be used to mask invalid public policy 24 or to dis-
criminate against claims based on foreign law. 25 However, if a
state refuses to permit its courts to hear any actions to enforce
judgments against it, the jurisdictional limitation 126 thus imposed
does not reflect discrimination based upon either the original
cause of action or its legal source, nor does it constitute invalid
public policy. The state would give precisely the same effect to the
foreign judgment as it would to its own. Furthermore, to disallow
the limit would lead to an absurd result: foreign judgments, but
only foreign judgments, would be cognizable in the state courts,
where they, and only they, would be enforceable for an amount
greater than anyone could collect in any way from a forum judg-
ment. The full faith and credit clause need not, nor should it, com-
pel such a dichotomy. 2 7
The Court in Hall permitted an unconsenting state to be sued
in the courts of another state because it focused on the continued
implications of international law governing relationships between
121. Fauntleroy v. Lur, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), in fact rested upon a finding that a
state statute precluding enforcement of certain judgments was not jurisdic-
tional; it went not to the power of the court but to its duty, and so only estab-
lished a rule of substantive law-a rule in conflict with the full faith and
credit clause and, therefore, invalid. See also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 440 (1943).
122. Thus far, only facts justifying dismissal under the common law doctrine of
forum non conveniens have been held sufficient to sustain a statute denying
enforcement jurisdiction. Anglo Am. Prov. Co. v. Davis Prov. Co. No. 1, 191
U.S. 373 (1903) (statute precluded suit by one foreign corporation against an-
other unless the cause of action arose in the forum).
123. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411 (1920).
124. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
125. First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609 (1951) (if state accepts jurisdiction over claims for wrongful death in
state, it cannot deny jurisdiction over claims arising outside the state and
based on foreign wrongful death statute). See Chambers v. Baltimore & 0.
R.R., 207 U.S. 142 (1907). See also McKnett v. St. Louis & SI. Ry., 292 U.S. 230
(1934) (if jurisdiction granted when claim brought by foreign corporation
based on law of another state, it cannot be denied because the claim is based
on federal law).
126. Traditionally, all limitations placed on waiver of immunity are jurisdictional.
See generally note 25 supra.
127. While it'is possible that congressional legislation could overturn the Court's
refusal to compel one state to recognize another's immunity statutes, should
the Court find that full faith and credit requires a defending state to enforce a
foreign judgment against it, legislation might be of no aid; the result could be
constitutionally commanded. See notes 95-96 & accompanying text supra.
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totally independent sovereigns and avoided any consideration of
the changed status of the states in a federal system. While recog-
nizing that the full faith and credit clause somehow affected that
status, the Court limited its impact in deference to the interests of
the forum. Although this approach produced a logical opinion with
respect to the specific questions presented, it is questionable in so
many other contexts that its application in Hall may create more
difficulties than it resolves. It certainly creates a number of contra-
dictions. For example, the Constitution is to be read literally to
determine the existence of state immunity in the courts of other
states; it is to be read in light of the "plan of Convention" to deter-
mine the existence of state immunity in the federal courts. The
Constitution does not include a guarantee of states' immunity
from suit in other state courts; it may include such a guarantee
when suit is commenced in the federal courts. The Constitution
grants original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to hear contro-
versies between the states, and by legislation such jurisdiction is
exclusive, in an attempt to ease whatever indignity a sovereign suf-
fers by being forced to defend against its will; there is no way in
which the same sovereign can prevent itself from being brought
before the lower courts of an equal, not superior, sovereign at the
behest of individuals. In a conflict between the states, bias is
avoided not only by the nature of the forum but by use of a neutral
body of law; in a conflict between an individual and a state, only
that bias which is a function of the forum can be avoided. Full
faith and credit is satisfied when a forum, refusing to utilize the
substantive law of another state, can demonstrate contacts which
give rise to jurisdiction in other situations; though the contacts jus-
tify activity of the forum as though it were an independent nation,
they may compel enforcement of a jurisdictionally permissible
judgment in another state through invocation of federal authority.
Sovereign immunity is an unpopular doctrine. No plaintiff en-
joys being confronted with it, and nearly everyone agrees that it
ought to be abolished--except the sovereign claiming it. Its logic is
anathema to our theory of government, and, as governments act to
a greater degree in a greater number of spheres than before, it be-
comes a more and more insulting anachronism. However, if it is to
be abolished, it ought to be abolished directly, by each sovereign.
To destroy it piecemeal is to produce confusing precedent and con-
tinuing problems.
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